Thanks to Bob and others for having me here today. The National Endowment for Democracy is an independent grantmaking institution dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world, and the International Forum for Democratic Studies \u2013 my section at NED \u2013 is essentially NED\u2019s research arm. Here and in a previous job countering disinformation at the U.S. State Department, I\u2019ve been consistently surprised by the enormity of the threat of disinformation and the power of the information space to either strengthen or undermine governance. Information is power. It’s a weapon and a shield. Healthy, independent forms of information are integral to the functioning of democracy. And bad, corrupted information creates divisions and distrust, which will eat away at democracy. Political polarization, distrust in government and key institutions like science, kleptocracy, and instability often have roots in a corrupted information space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But I look forward today to hearing from you all about how this issue looks in the African context, to hear your ideas, and learn from you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before talking about the African context, I wanted to first step back to make sure we have a common understanding about what is and isn\u2019t disinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[Slide 2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First: some definitions of terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At its most basic element, disinformation is socially or <\/em>politically motivated<\/em> and deliberately misleading<\/em> messaging. Let’s use an example from perhaps the most common language for the world…the world of football (or in my case, soccer). \u201cChristian Ronaldo is a terrible soccer player and hates children.\u201d This statement is deliberately misleading (he is amazing) and it has a social or political effect (of making him a pariah in society for hating his most adoring fans).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, to misinformation: false information that is spread, regardless of intent<\/em>. Suppose a casual soccer fan reads this statement on Facebook from his friend, and then likes or shares that post for any variety of reasons (maybe it was funny, he\u2019s a Manchester United fan, whatever). That is misinformation, and it\u2019s a major problem in the highly stressed and decentralized media industry…the unintentional spread of false information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Next, malinformation. Malinformation is genuine information presented without proper context in order to deceive audiences. Back to our example: \u201cChristian Ronaldo misses goals every game, and children can\u2019t stand him.\u201d What is missing here is the context: Christian Ronaldo takes a little over 5 shots per game…and makes just over 1 a game (an incredibly high rate). And the children that hate him are simply children who live in Milan and grew up rooting for the main rival of Ronaldo\u2019s team in nearby Turin. Most young soccer fans really like Ronaldo, but that\u2019s vital, essential<\/em> context that is left out. Propaganda operates similarly as mal-information, but it\u2019s state-generated messaging. So, in our example, the governor of Turin says \u201cChristian Ronaldo misses goals every game, and children can\u2019t stand him.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The term \u201cfake news\u201d has become a loaded term, and one that is poorly understood and honestly difficult to separate from the abuse of the term by illiberal leaders, everyday citizens, and media organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Disinformation, which really is at the root of these manipulations of the information space operate in a few ways globally and locally. I would simply separate the types of information into two categories: authentic behavior and inauthentic behavior. Authentic behavior takes the form of official, intentional, and overt <\/em>amplification of false information. This can take the form of press or political leaders conducting false messaging or enclosed groups \u2013 like Facebook or WhatsApp groups \u2013 doing the same where real, genuine citizens are developing and spreading lies. Inauthentic behavior is the use of bots, paid accounts, imposter websites, or other covert tools. These activities utilize personas that are not who they say they are. A common tactic is called \u201castroturfing,\u201d coming from the practice of using fake grass instead of real grass on yards outside of homes. Astroturfing involves the use of multiple, centrally-controlled social media accounts to amplify official, state-driven disinformation that gives the appearance of broad support for that state\u2019s official position. The use of fake Chinese Twitter accounts \u2013 called the 50-cent army because that\u2019s how much they are paid per post – is common among China\u2019s official propaganda outlets. A huge amount of Twitter accounts \u2013 usually newly created ones that only follow each others\u2019 accounts \u2013 immediately like and retweet the misleading tweets of China\u2019s official foreign ministry spokesperson.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Disinformation can spread even more quickly in social media through the use of advanced technologies like natural language processing to make content sound like it came from a human (but without having to pay for one), or micro-targeting of specific populations, or the use of certain algorithms that continue feeding disinformation to groups when those groups heavily engage the content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [Slide 3]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, to the African context. Recently, we organized a workshop with a variety of African civil society organizations, journalists, and researchers to discuss the impact of disinformation on the African media environment. A few trends emerged from these the discussions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [Slide 4]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The workshop we held also developed some solutions for civil society organizations, and I think journalism more specifically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [Slide 5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n